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Abstract—This paper considers the secrecy transmission in
a large-scale unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)-enabled wireless
network, in which a set of UAVs in the sky transmit confi-
dential information to their respective legitimate receivers on
the ground, in the presence of another set of randomly dis-
tributed suspicious ground eavesdroppers. We assume that the
horizontal locations of legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers
are distributed as two independent homogeneous Possion point
processes (PPPs), and each of the UAVs is positioned exactly
above its corresponding legitimate receiver for efficient secrecy
communication. Furthermore, we consider an elevation-angle-
dependent line-of-sight (LoS)/non-LoS (NLoS) path-loss model
for air-to-ground (A2G) wireless channels and employ the wiretap
code for secrecy transmission. Under such setups, we first charac-
terize the secrecy communication performance (in terms of the
connection probability, secrecy outage probability, and secrecy
transmission capacity) in mathematically tractable forms, and
accordingly optimize the system configurations (i.e., the wiretap
code rates and UAV positioning altitude) to maximize the secrecy
transmission capacity, subject to a maximum secrecy outage
probability constraint. Next, we propose to use the secrecy guard
zone technique for further secrecy protection, and analyze the
correspondingly achieved secrecy communication performance.
Finally, we present numerical results to validate the theoretical
analysis. It is shown that the employment of secrecy guard zone
significantly improves the secrecy transmission capacity of this
network, and the desirable guard zone radius generally decreases
monotonically as the UAVs’ and/or the eavesdroppers’ densities
increase.
Index Terms—UAV communications, physical layer security,
homogeneous Poisson point process (PPP), secrecy transmission
capacity, secrecy guard zone.
I. INTRODUCTION
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones are envisioned
to have a wide range of commercial and civilian applications,
such as cargo delivery, rescue and search, filming, surveillance,
and aerial communication/charging platforms (see, e.g., [1–6]
and the references therein). To enable these new applications,
how to integrate UAVs into wireless communications networks
is becoming an emerging topic for the wireless communi-
cations society. On one hand, UAVs can be connected with
terrestrial wireless communications networks (e.g., cellular
networks) as users for not only ultra-reliable and low-latency
non-payload command and control but also high-speed pay-
load data transmission [7, 8]. On the other hand, UAVs can
be employed as aerial communication platforms (such as base
stations (BSs) or relays) to serve subscribers on the ground in,
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e.g., emergency situations, cell edges, and temporary hotspots
[1, 2, 9].
The design of UAV-enabled wireless communications intro-
duces various technical challenges due to the following differ-
ences from conventional terrestrial wireless communications.
First, air-to-ground (A2G) wireless channels usually possess
strong line-of-sight (LoS) components, especially when the
elevation angle becomes large. Such strong LoS links are
beneficial in offering better channel conditions for efficient
UAV communications; however, they also result in strong co-
channel interference that is harmful and thus should be prop-
erly managed. Next, UAVs have fully controllable mobility
in the three-dimensional (3D) space. Although this introduces
new challenges in mobility management for wireless networks,
such a feature can also be exploited with proper UAV position-
ing/trajectory design for performance optimization (see, e.g.,
[1, 8–15] and the references therein). Furthermore, security
is another key issue faced in UAV-enabled wireless networks.
Compared with conventional terrestrial communications, the
A2G communication links are more vulnerable to be inter-
cepted. Due to the existence of strong LoS components over
A2G links, the UAVs’ transmitted confidential data is more
likely to be overheard by suspicious eavesdroppers over a large
area on the ground. In this paper, we focus on the secrecy
transmission in UAV-enabled wireless networks.
Over recent years, physical layer security has emerged as a
viable new solution to secure wireless communications against
suspicious eavesdropping attacks, which is a good complemen-
tary to conventional cryptography-based anti-eavesdropping
techniques (see, e.g., [16–20] and the references therein).
In the physical layer security design, the secrecy rate is a
widely-adopted performance metric, which is defined as the
achievable rate of the confidential information transmitted over
a wireless channel, provided that the eavesdroppers cannot
decode any such information. It is well-established in [21, 22]
that for a Gaussian wiretap channel, the maximum secrecy
rate or secrecy capacity corresponds to the difference of the
legitimate channel’s Shannon capacity and the eavesdropping
channel’s. However, achieving such perfect secrecy requires
the transmitter to perfectly know the instantaneous channel
state information (CSI) with both legitimate receivers and ille-
gitimate/suspicious eavesdroppers, which is quite challenging
and even infeasible in practical wireless systems. To tackle
this issue and considering that the transmitter only knows
the stochastic CSI (distributions of the channels), the secrecy
outage rate/capacity becomes a favorable design metric, which
is defined as the achievable communication rate of confidential
information, provided that the secrecy outage probability (i.e.,
the probability that such information is eavesdropped) is less
than a certain threshold (see, e.g., [23–25] and the references
therein).
Motivated by the great success in terrestrial communica-
tions, using physical-layer security to protect the confiden-
tiality of UAV-enabled wireless communications has attracted
growing research interest recently. In the literature, there are
generally two lines of research that focused on resource alloca-
tion for maximizing the secrecy communication performance
at the link level [26–34], and network performance analysis
and design by using stochastic geometry at the network level
[35]. At the link level, prior works [26–34] exploited the
UAVs’ controllable mobility via trajectory design, jointly with
wireless resource allocation, to maximize the UAV’s secrecy
rate or secrecy outage rate. At the network level, to our
best knowledge, [35] is the only work that investigated the
average secrecy rate of large-scale UAV-enabled millimeter
wave (mmWave) networks, in which UAVs are distributed as a
Mate´rn hardcore point process and a part of them are employed
for cooperative jamming. Despite such research progress,
the fundamental secrecy communication performance (e.g.,
with secrecy outage consideration) of large-scale UAV-enabled
wireless networks still remains not well addressed. This thus
motivates our investigation in this work.
From the technical or stochastic geometry perspective,
the analysis and design of large-scale secrecy UAV-enabled
wireless networks are very challenging due to the following
new considerations that are different from conventional ter-
restrial wireless communications (e.g., conventional cellular
networks). First, as UAVs can adjust their 3D locations for
performance optimization, the point process representing the
UAVs’ horizontal locations is generally correlated with that
of the ground nodes’ (GNs’) locations. Due to such corre-
lation, the network analysis becomes a very difficult task.
Furthermore, due to the additional degree of freedom in the
UAV attitude, the locations of UAVs do not follow a 2D
homogeneous point process, thus making the conventional
analysis approaches not applicable. Next, A2G wireless chan-
nels generally depend on the elevation angles between UAVs
and GNs. If the elevation angle is large, then the A2G channel
is more likely to have strong LoS components; while if it is
small, then the A2G channel is more likely to be non-LoS
(NLoS) due to the obstacles between them (see, e.g., [10, 36]).
Such elevation-angle-dependent LoS/NLoS wireless channels
make the network analysis even more difficult.
To address the above issues, in this paper we consider
a large-scale 3D UAV-enabled wireless network, in which a
set of quasi-stationary UAVs in the sky transmit confidential
information to their respective legitimate ground receivers, in
the presence of another set of randomly distributed suspicious
ground eavesdroppers. We suppose that all UAVs are posi-
tioned at the same altitude, as commonly assumed in the UAV
communication literature [30, 35, 37, 38]. Furthermore, we
model the horizontal locations of legitimate receivers and sus-
picious eavesdroppers as two independent homogeneous Pois-
son point processes (PPPs) [39–44]. As UAVs can adjust its
positioning locations for secrecy communication performance
optimization, we suppose that each of the UAV transmitters is
positioned exactly above its corresponding ground legitimate
receiver, which can help improve the secrecy communication
rate in our considered scenario. Accordingly, the UAVs’ hori-
zontal locations are modeled as the homogeneous PPP that is
identical to the legitimate receivers. In addition, we consider
an elevation-angle-dependent LoS/NLoS channel model for
A2G wireless channels, such that the A2G channel is LoS
when the elevation angle is larger than a given threshold,
while it is NLoS otherwise. This model is consistent with
the practically measured dual-slope path-loss model for A2G
channels [36, (4)]. Furthermore, the LoS consideration at large
elevation angle also follows the A2G channel models specified
by 3GPP [45], in which the LoS probability becomes one as
the elevation angle becomes larger than a given threshold (see
[45, Table B-1] for details).
Under such setups, the main results of this paper are
summarized as follows.
• First, we analytically derive the exact expressions for the
connection probability, secrecy outage probability, and
secrecy transmission capacity of this network. However,
these expressions are mathematically too complicated
to draw insights. To tackle this issue, we propose to
approximate each LoS A2G channel as a Rayleigh-
fading channel with the same path loss. Accordingly,
we obtain the connection probability, secrecy outage
probability, and secrecy transmission capacity in math-
ematically tractable forms. Building upon such analysis,
we optimize the system configurations (i.e., the wiretap
code rates and UAV positioning altitude) to maximize
the secrecy transmission capacity subject to a maximum
secrecy outage probability constraint.
• Next, we propose to use the secrecy guard zone tech-
nique for further secrecy protection, such that each UAV
only communicates when there are no eavesdroppers
within this zone of a certain radius. In this case, we
obtain mathematically-tractable analytic expressions of
the connection probability, secrecy outage probability,
and secrecy transmission capacity, by similarly using the
above approximations for LoS channels. Furthermore, we
optimize the wiretap code rates, UAV positioning altitude,
and guard zone radius, in order to maximize the secrecy
transmission capacity.
• Finally, we present numerical results to validate the above
theoretical analysis. It is shown that the employment of
secrecy guard zone significantly improves the secrecy
transmission capacity of this network, and the desirable
guard zone radius generally decreases monotonically as
the UAVs’ and/or the eavesdroppers’ densities increase.
It is also shown that the UAVs should be positioned at the
lowest altitude for maximizing the secrecy transmission
capacity.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents the system model of our considered 3D large-scale
UAV-enabled wireless network. Section III analyzes the se-
crecy communication performance of this network. Section IV
optimizes the system configurations to maximize the secrecy
transmission capacity. Section V proposes to use the secrecy
guard zone technique for further secrecy protection. Section
VI presents numerical results. Finally, Section VII concludes
this paper.
Legitimate receiver Suspicious receiverUAV
Fig. 1. Illustration of the 3D large-scale UAV-enabled wireless network.
Notations: R denotes the set of all real numbers; ‖ · ‖
denotes the Euclidean norm; P (·) denotes the probability
operator; E (·) stands for the statistical expectation of a random
variable; W0 (·) denotes the principal branch of Lambert W
function; arcsin (·) is the arc sine function; cot (·) is the
cotangent function; arctan (·) is the arc tangent function.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this work, we consider a 3D large-scale UAV-enabled
wireless network as shown in Fig. 1, in which a large number
of randomly distributed UAVs in the sky transmit confidential
information to their respective legitimate receivers on the
ground, in the presence of randomly distributed suspicious
ground eavesdroppers.1 We model the horizontal locations
of ground legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers as two
independent homogeneous PPPs with density λu and λe,
which are denoted by Φu and Φe, respectively.
2 It is assumed
that each UAV is positioned exactly above the corresponding
legitimate receiver for improving the secrecy communica-
1In this paper, we consider the eavesdroppers are randomly distributed on
the ground, as their locations may be uncertain in practice. For example,
the eavesdroppers can be users within the same network, which do not
have the right to access their communicated messages; the eavesdroppers
can also be malicious nodes outside the network. In both cases, the UAVs
may not know the exact locations of these eavesdroppers but only know their
distribution information. As a result, it is practically relevant to assume that
the eavesdroppers are randomly distributed on the ground. Actually, this is
also a commonly adopted assumption in the physical-layer security literature
for large-scale network performance analysis [16, 17, 20, 23–25, 35].
2Modeling the distributions of legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers in
terms of PPP has been proved very helpful for analyzing large-scale wireless
communication networks, which not only naturally captures the randomness
of the eavesdroppers’ locations, but also is very tractable because of its
powerful mathematical tools. It provides a probabilistic way of estimating
spatial averages that generally capture the key dependencies of the network
performance characteristics (connectivity, capacity, etc.) as functions of a
relatively small number of parameters. This helps provide insights and
facilitate the system design [46].
tion performance.3 Furthermore, for ease of exposition and
as commonly adopted in the UAV communication literature
[30, 35, 37, 38], it is assumed that all UAVs are positioned
at the same altitude H > 0, which is a design variable to
be optimized later. Let Hmax and Hmin denote the UAVs’
maximum and minimum altitudes, respectively. We thus have
Hmin ≤ H ≤ Hmax. Furthermore, it is assumed that each UAV-
and-legitimate-receiver pair does not know the exact locations
and CSI of other UAV-and-legitimate-receiver pairs and those
of eavesdroppers, but only knows the corresponding statistical
information (e.g., the eavesdroppers’ density4).
+
q [\
UAV
GN
q F
LoS region NLoS  region
.
[\'
Fig. 2. Illustration of the considered elevation-angle-dependent LoS/NLoS
path-loss model.
As for the A2G wireless channel, we consider an elevation-
angle-dependent LoS/NLoS path-loss model with a angle
threshold θc as shown in Fig. 2, which is explained in detail
as follows. Consider any one particular communication link
from UAV transmitter x at position wx ∈ R3×1 to GN
receiver y (i.e., legitimate receiver or eavesdropper) at position
wy ∈ R3×1, in which we use Dxy = ‖wx − wy‖ to
denote their distance, θxy =
180
π
arcsin
(
H
Dxy
)
denotes the
corresponding elevation angle. In this case, if the elevation
angle θxy is larger than the threshold θc (or, equivalently, the
GN is located within a disk with radius K = H cot (θc)), then
the A2G link is assumed to be LoS dominated, for which the
channel power gain is dominated by the path loss, denoted
by η
L
D
−α
L
xy . Here, ηL denotes the LoS channel power gain
at the reference distance of one meter, and α
L
denotes the
path-loss exponent in the LoS case with α
L
= 2. Otherwise,
if the elevation angle θxy is no larger than the threshold θc
3It is shown in [27, 31, 32, 34] that when the eavesdroppers’ locations
are given and known a-priori, the UAV should be positioned at the opposite
direction of these eavesdroppers to maximize the secrecy rate. In our consid-
ered scenario with eavesdroppers randomly distributed over all directions, it is
generally desirable to position the UAV exactly above the legitimate receiver
to maximize the secrecy communication performance.
4If the eavesdroppers are active in transmissions, then UAVs can monitor
their transmission to estimate the corresponding density. On the other hand,
if the eavesdroppers are passive, UAVs can still detect the eavesdroppers
under different scenarios. In the first scenario, the eavesdroppers can belong
to the same network as the legitimate nodes, but do not have the right to
access their communicated messages. In this scenario, UAVs can obtain the
knowledge of λe from the network controller directly. In the other scenario,
the eavesdroppers can be malicious nodes outside the network. In this scenario,
UAVs can detect the passive eavesdropping based on the local oscillator power
leaked from the eavesdropper’s RF front end [47], and accordingly estimate
the value of λe.
(or, equivalently, the GN is outside the disk with radius K),
then the A2G channel only has NLoS links, for which the
channel power gain consists of the pathloss and a Rayleigh
fading coefficient, denoted by η
N
SND
−α
N
xy , where ηN denotes
the NLoS channel power gain at the reference distance of
one meter, α
N
denotes the path-loss exponent in the NLoS
case with α
N
= 4 , and SN is an exponentially distributed
random variable with unit mean. By combining the two cases
and denoting Pt > 0 as the transmit power by UAV x, the
received signal power at GN y is given by
Pr = ηxyPtSxyD
−αxy
xy , (1)
where η
xy
denotes the channel power gain at the reference
distance of one meter from UAV x to GN y with ηxy ={
η
L
, if θxy>θc,
η
N
, if θxy≤θc, αxy denotes the path-loss exponent with
α
xy
=
{
α
L
, if θxy>θc,
α
N
, if θxy≤θc, and Sxy denotes the channel power
fading gain with Sxy=
{
1, if θxy>θc,
SN , if θxy≤θc. It is worth noting
that the considered elevation-angle-dependent LoS/NLoS path-
loss model is consistent with the practically measured dual-
slope path-loss model in [36, (4)].
Furthermore, due to the strong LoS channel power gains
over A2G links, we assume that the UAV-enabled wireless
network is interference-limited by considering the UAVs are
densely deployed, such that the background noise is negligible
at each GN receiver. Under such assumptions, the mutual
information or Shannon capacity of an A2G wireless link is
determined by the received signal-to-interference ratio (SIR)
at the GN. First, consider a typical legitimate receiver located
at the origin of the ground plane, for which the received SIR
is
SIR0 =
η
L
PtH
−2∑
u∈Φu
η
u0
PtSu0D
−αu0
u0
=
η
L
H−2∑
u∈Φu
η
u0
Su0D
−αu0
u0
, (2)
where Su0 denotes the channel power fading gain from
interfering UAV u ∈ Φu to the typical legitimate receiver,
η
u0
denotes the reference path loss of this link, αu0 denotes
the path-loss exponent of this link, and Du0 denotes their
distance. Note that according to the Slivnyak’s Theorem [48],
it follows that the spatial distribution of the interfering UAVs
still follows a homogeneous PPP with density Φu, provided
that the typical UAV transmitter’s location is given. By slight
abuse of notation, we denote Φu as the set of interfering UAVs
in this paper.
Next, we consider any one particular eavesdropper e ∈ Φe.
Suppose that the eavesdroppers are non-cooperative and de-
code the typical UAV transmitter’s sent messages individually.
In this case, the received SIR at eavesdropper e is
SIRe =
η
0e
PtS0eD
−α0e
0e∑
u∈Φu
η
ue
PtSueD
−αue
ue
=
η
0e
S0eD
−α0e
0e∑
u∈Φu
η
ue
SueD
−αue
ue
, (3)
where S0e denotes the channel power fading gain from the
typical UAV transmitter to eavesdropper e ∈ Φe, η0e denotes
the reference path loss of this link, α0e denotes the path-
loss exponent of this link, and D0e denotes their distance.
Furthermore, Sue denotes the channel power fading gain from
interfering UAV u ∈ Φu to eavesdropper e ∈ Φe, ηue denotes
the reference path loss of this link, αue denotes the path-loss
exponent of this link, and Due denotes their distance.
Accordingly, the Shannon capacity of the legitimate channel
between the typical UAV-to-legitimate-receiver pair (in bits-
per-second-per-Hertz (bps/Hz)) is expressed as
Ct = log2 (1 + SIR0) . (4)
The Shannon capacity of the eavesdropping channel from the
typical UAV transmitter to the eavesdropper with the strongest
SIR is expressed as
Ce = log2
(
1 + max
e∈Φe
{SIRe}
)
. (5)
Accordingly, the achievable secrecy rate at the typical legiti-
mate receiver is expressed as
Cb = [Ct − Ce]+ , (6)
where [x]
+
, max (x, 0). Here, notice that the secrecy rate is
limited by the eavesdropper with the strongest SIR.
We adopt the well-established Wyner’s encoding scheme for
the UAVs’ secrecy transmission [21]. The Wyner’s encoding
scheme is implemented as follows in a nested nature based
on two coding rates, namely the rate Rt of the transmitted
codewords and Rs of the confidential information, where
Rt ≥ Rs must hold. In particular, a wiretap code is constructed
by generating 2MRt codewords xM (w, v) each of length M ,
where w ∈ {1, . . . , 2MRs} and v ∈ {1, . . . , 2M(Rt−Rs)}. For
each secrecy message with index w to be secretly transmitted,
we have several possible codewords {1, . . . , 2M(Rt−Rs)} that
form a bin, which is named as a subcode of the wiretap
code. Accordingly, to transmit secrecy message with index w,
we must randomly choose one codeword with index v from
these codewords {1, . . . , 2M(Rt−Rs)} with uniform probability
to confuse eavesdroppers, and thus we have the codeword
xM (w, v) to be transmitted. Notice that the same values of Rt
and Rs are used at different UAVs over the whole network,
which are design variables to be optimized later. Accordingly,
the rate difference Re = Rt −Rs represents the rate loss for
transmitting the message securely against eavesdropping [24].
With the Wyner’s encoding scheme, the typical UAV’s data
transmission is successful only when the Shannon capacity
Ct of the legitimate channel is larger than the rate Rt of
the transmitted codewords, i.e., the received SIR0 at the
legitimate receiver exceeds the threshold βt = 2
Rt − 1. Then
the connection probability, defined as the probability that
the typical legitimate receiver is able to decode the UAV’s
transmitted message, is expressed as
Pc = P (Ct > Rt) = P (SIR0 > βt)
= P

 ηLH−2∑
u∈Φu
η
0
Su0D
−αu0
u0
> βt

 . (7)
Furthermore, the typical UAV’s transmitted confidential in-
formation can be successfully decoded at the eavesdroppers,
when the Shannon capacity Ce of the best eavesdropping link
is larger than the rate difference Re = Rt − Rs, i.e., the
strongest SIRmax
e∈Φe
{SIRe} exceeds the threshold βe = 2Re−1.
In this case, the secrecy outage occurs. Accordingly, the
secrecy outage probability, defined as the probability that
the eavesdropper is able to intercept the UAV’s transmitted
confidential information, is expressed as [24]
Pso = P (Ce > Re) = P
(
max
e∈Φe
{SIRe} > βe
)
= P

max
e∈Φe

 η0SeD
−αs
e∑
u∈Φu
η
0
SueD
−αue
ue

 > βe

 . (8)
Accordingly, the secrecy transmission capacity of the UAV-
enabled wireless network is defined as the average achievable
rate of confidential messages that are successfully transmitted
per unit area [23], which is given as
Cˆs = RsPcλu. (9)
We are particularly interested in designing the system
parameters (e.g., the wiretap code rates Rt and Rs, and
the UAVs’ positioning altitude H), for the purpose of max-
imizing the secrecy transmission capacity Cˆs of the UAV-
enabled wireless network, while satisfying a maximum secrecy
outage probability constraint. This, however, is generally a
very challenging task, as the exact expressions of the secrecy
communication performance metrics in (7), (8), and (9) are not
available yet. Towards this end, in the following two sections
we first derive the analytical expressions for these terms, and
then solve the secrecy transmission capacity maximization
problem.
III. SECRECY COMMUNICATION PERFORMANCE
ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the connection probability and
secrecy outage probability of the typical UAV-and-legitimate-
receiver pair. The analytical results will be used to measure
the secrecy transmission capacity of the UAV-enabled wireless
network later.
To facilitate the derivation, we denote ΦLy as the set of
interfering UAVs with LoS wireless links to GN y, i.e., for
any interfering UAV l ∈ ΦLy, its location wl ∈ R3×1 satisfies
‖wl −wy‖ ≤
√
K2 +H2. Then we have the following two
theorems.
Theorem 1: The connection probability of a typical UAV-
and-legitimate-receiver pair Pc in (7) is given by
Pc = EΦu
{ ∑
u∈Φu\ΦL0
∏
m∈Φu\ΦL0,m 6=u
D
α
N
m0
D
α
N
m0 −D
α
N
u0
×
(
1− exp
[
− ηLD
α
N
u0
η
N
βtH2
+
η
L
D
α
N
u0
η
N
∑
l∈ΦL0
D
−α
L
l0
])}
. (10)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Theorem 2: The secrecy outage probability of a typical
UAV-to-legitimate-receiver pair Pso in (8) is given by
Pso = 1− EΦu
{
exp
[
−λe
{∫
B(o,K)
(11)
∑
u∈Φu\ΦLe
∏
m∈Φu\ΦLe,m 6=u
D
α
N
me
D
α
N
me −DαNue(
1− exp
[
− ηLD
α
N
ue
η
N
βeD
α
L
0e
+
η
L
D
α
N
ue
η
N
∑
l∈ΦLe
D
−α
L
le
])}
de
+
∫
R2\B(o,K)
∏
l∈ΦLe
{
exp
[
−ηLβeD
α
N
0e
η
N
D
α
L
le
]}
×
∏
u∈Φu\ΦLe
{
1
1 + βeD
α
N
0e D
−α
N
ue
}
de
}]}
,
where B (o,K) represents a disk of radius K centered at o.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Theorems 1 and 2 show the exact expressions of the connec-
tion probability and secrecy outage probability for the UAV-
enabled wireless network. However, due to the involvement
of statistical expectation in (10) and (11), these expressions
are too complicated to draw insights. Besides, it is difficult
to solve the secrecy transmission capacity maximization prob-
lem based on these expressions. To resolve these issues, in
the following we resort to approximate expressions of the
connection probability and secrecy outage probability. Notice
that the key difficulty in deriving mathematically tractable
connection and secrecy outage probabilities lies in the fact that
the A2G channels are LoS when the elevation angle exceeds
threshold θc. In this case, the A2G channel power gain and
accordingly the received signal power in the SIR expressions
become constant, under which it is very difficult to handle the
expectation over SIR terms as the received interference power
corresponds to the sum of various independent exponential
random variables. This thus leads to complicated expressions
in (10) and (11) with statistical expectation involved. By
contrast, if the A2G channel is NLoS when elevation angle
is no larger than θc, the channel power gain and the received
signal power in the SIR terms become exponentially random
variables. By exploiting this feature, the expectation over
the received interference power (i.e., sum of independent
exponential random variables) can be turned into a tractable
form. Motivated by this fact, we propose to approximate the
LoS A2G channel into a Rayleigh fading channel with the
same path loss. In other words, for any A2G channel from
UAV x to GN y, we consider that the channel fading power
gain Sxy is an exponentially distributed random variable with
unit mean, denoted by S¯xy , regardless of the elevation angle.
Accordingly, the received SIR at the typical legitimate receiver
and that at eavesdropper e are respective approximated as
SIR0 =
η
L
PtS00H
−2∑
u∈Φu
η
u0
PtSu0D
−αu0
u0
=
η
L
S00H
−2∑
u∈Φu
η
u0
Su0D
−αu0
u0
, (12)
SIRe =
η
0e
PtS0eD
−α0e
0e∑
u∈Φu
η
ue
PtSueD
−αue
ue
=
η
0e
S0eD
−α0e
0e∑
u∈Φu
η
ue
SueD
−αue
ue
. (13)
Accordingly, the approximate connection and secrecy outage
probabilities of a typical UAV-and-legitimate-receiver pair are
respectively denoted as
P˜c = P

 ηLS00H−2∑
u∈Φu
η
u0
Su0D
−αu0
u0
> βt

 , (14)
P˜so =P

max
e∈Φe

 η0eS0eD
−α0e
0e∑
u∈Φu
η
ue
SueD
−αue
ue

 > βe

 . (15)
Then we have the following two theorems.
Corollary 1: The approximate connection probability of a
typical UAV-and-legitimate-receiver pair in (14) is given by
P˜c =exp
[
− πλuHβ
1
2
t η
1
2
N
2η
1
2
L
×

π − 2 arctan

η 12L (H2 +K2)
η
1
2
NHβ
1
2
t




− πλuH2βt log
(
H2βt +H
2 +K2
H2βt +H2
)]
, (16)
Proof: See Appendix C.
Corollary 2: The approximate secrecy outage probability of
a typical UAV-and-legitimate-receiver pair in (15) is given by
P˜so = 1− exp
[
−2πλe exp
[
πλuH
2
]
×
{
η
1
2
L
2η
1
2
NQ1
exp
[
−η
1
2
N
η
1
2
L
Q1
(
H2 +K2
)]
+
(1 +HQ1) exp [−HQ1]
Q21
−
(
1 +Q1
√
H2 +K2
)
exp
[−Q1√H2 +K2]
Q21
}]
, (17)
where Q1 =
λuπ
2β
1
2
e
2 .
Proof: See Appendix D.
Corollaries 1 and 2 provide the connection probability and
secrecy outage probability in closed forms, which can provide
insights and facilitate the system design later in Section IV. For
example, Corollary 1 shows that the approximate connection
probability P˜c is monotonically decreasing with respect to the
radius K of the LoS region. This is due to the fact that as
K increases, more interfering links are strong LoS links, thus
leading to stronger interference and reduced P˜c.
Figs. 3 and 4 show the approximate connection probability
in (16) and secrecy outage probability in (17), respectively, as
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Fig. 3. The connection probability versus the UAVs’ (or legitimate receivers’)
density λu, where we set Rt = 5, and θc = pi/4.
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Fig. 4. The secrecy outage probability versus the eavesdroppers’ density λe,
where we set λu = 10−3, H = 10 m, and θc = pi/4.
compared to the Monte Carlo simulations. It is observed in
Fig. 3 that our proposed approximate connection probability
in (16) matches well with the Monte Carlo simulation results.
Furthermore, it is observed in Fig. 4 that our proposed approx-
imate secrecy outage probability in (17) matches well with
the Monte Carlo simulation results under practical scenarios
when the secrecy outage probability is small (e.g., 0 ∼ 0.1).
This validates the accuracy of approximating the A2G LoS
channels into Rayleigh fading channels when the elevation
angles are smaller than θc. Therefore, the approximation
into Rayleigh fading channels is not only tractable but also
practically reasonable under our consideration. Notice that the
Nakagami-m or Rician fading may be more accurate to model
or approximate the LoS-dominated A2G channels, which can
be left for future work.
IV. SECRECY TRANSMISSION CAPACITY MAXIMIZATION
In this section, based on the above approximations, we
jointly design the wiretap code rates Rt and Rs, and the UAV
positioning altitude H to maximize the secrecy transmission
capacity while satisfying a maximum secrecy outage probabil-
ity constraint. With the approximations in (16) and (17), the
secrecy maximization problem is expressed as
(P1.1) : max
Rt,Rs,H
C˜s = RsP˜cλu, (18a)
s.t. P˜so ≤ ǫ, (18b)
Rt ≥ Rs, (18c)
Rs ≥ 0, (18d)
Hmax ≥ H ≥ Hmin, (18e)
where ǫ ∈ [0, 1] represents the minimum security requirement.
Notice that problem (P1.1) is still difficult to be optimally
solved, as the design parameters are highly interrelated. In the
following, we first obtain the closed-form solution of Rt and
Rs under any given UAV positioning altitude H , and then
use a one-dimensional (1D) search over H ∈ [Hmin, Hmax] to
maximize the secrecy transmission capacity. In the following,
we only need to focus on finding the optimal Rt and Rs under
any given H , for which the problem is expressed as
(P1.2) : max
Rt,Rs
C˜s = RsP˜cλu, (19a)
s.t. P˜so ≤ ǫ, (19b)
Rt ≥ Rs, (19c)
Rs ≥ 0. (19d)
In order to solve problem (P1.2), notice that P˜so in (19b)
only depends on Rt − Rs. To facilitate the derivation, we
introduce the auxiliary variable Re = Rt−Rs. By substituting
Rs = Rt −Re, problem (P1.2) is equivalent to
(P1.3) : max
Rt,Re
C˜s = (Rt −Re)P˜cλu, (20a)
s.t. P˜so ≤ ǫ, (20b)
Rt ≥ Re, (20c)
Re ≥ 0. (20d)
Notice that from (15), it follows that P˜so is monotonically
decreasing with respect to βe, where βe = 2
Re−1. Therefore,
it is evident that both P˜so and C˜s are monotonically decreasing
functions with respect to Re ≥ 0. Hence, at the optimality
of problem (P1.3), constraint (20b) must be met with strict
equality, i.e.,
P˜so = ǫ. (21)
By using a 1D search to get a unique solution to the equality
in (21), which is the optimal solution of Re to problem (P1.3),
denoted by R∗e .
Next, it remains to find the solution of Rt to problem (P1.3).
Notice that for x→ 0, it holds that arctan (x) ≈ x and log(1+
x) ≈ x. As βt ≫ 1 generally holds, we have
P˜c ≈ P¯c = exp
[
−π
2
λuH
(
η
1
2
N
η
1
2
L
π2
Rt
2 − 2H
)]
. (22)
In this case, solving for Rt in problem (P1.3) is approxi-
mated as
(P1.4) : max
Rt
Cs = (Rt −R∗e)P¯cλu, (23a)
s.t. Rt ≥ R∗e . (23b)
We then have the following theorem.
Theorem 3: The objective function Cs in (23a) is a concave
function with respect to Rt ≥ 0. The optimal solution of Rt
to problem (P1.4) is given as
R∗t = R
∗
e +
2
ln 2
W0
(
η
1
2
L 2
−R∗e+1
η
1
2
Nπ2λuH
)
. (24)
Proof: See Appendix E.
By combining R∗t and R
∗
e , the corresponding Rs is obtained
as
R∗s =
2
ln 2
W0
(
η
1
2
L 2
−R∗e+1
η
1
2
Nπ2λuH
)
. (25)
Therefore, by combining R∗t and R
∗
s , together with the 1D
search over H , the desirable system configurations are finally
obtained.
V. SECRECY GUARD ZONE
In this section, we adopt the secrecy guard zone technique to
further protect the UAVs’ secrecy transmission. Although the
guard zone technique has been widely applied in conventional
secrecy wireless communications [23, 49–53], the employment
in secrecy UAV communications is new and has not been
studied yet. In particular, we suppose that each UAV is able
to physically detect the existence of suspicious eavesdroppers
within a certain finite region, namely the secrecy guard zone
[23]. This region is modeled as a disk on the ground, with a
given radius D centered at the UAV’s horizontal projection.
Accordingly, each UAV transmits confidential messages only
when there is no eavesdropper inside the corresponding se-
crecy guard zone. If there are any eavesdropper(s) found inside
the secrecy guard zone, the UAV will generate artificial noise
(AN) to confuse these eavesdroppers for helping mask nearby
UAVs’ confidential message transmissions. Note that the AN
is assumed to be statistically identical to the confidential
messages and hence cannot be distinguished by eavesdroppers.
Also note that this cooperative protocol is implemented in
a distributed manner, and does not require any coordination
between UAV transmitters.
A. Secrecy Communication Performance Analysis
In this subsection, we analyze the connection probabil-
ity and secrecy outage probability of the typical UAV-and-
legitimate-receiver pair, in the case with the guard zone
employed.
For any legitimate receiver or eavesdropper, the set of
interfering UAVs can still be denoted as Φu with density
λu, which is same as that in Section III without the secrecy
guard zone used. Hence, the exact and approximate connection
probabilities are also given as Pc in (10) and P˜c in (16),
respectively. Nevertheless, with the secrecy guard zone, the
set of UAV transmitters is reduced as Φu
′ with density λu′
given by [23]
λu
′ = λu exp
[−πλeD2] . (26)
Accordingly, for the typical legitimate receiver at the origin,
the set of eavesdroppers Φe follows a homogeneous PPP
with density λe outside B (o,D). In this case, by modifying
the distributed area of the eavesdroppers from the whole
ground plane R2 in (8) to R2 \B (o,D), the secrecy outage
probability Pso is re-expressed as
Pzoneso = P

 max
‖we‖≥D,∀e∈Φe

 η0eS0eD
−α0e
0e∑
u∈Φu
η
ue
SueD
−αue
ue

 > βe

 .
(27)
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 4: Under the secrecy guard zone with radius D,
the secrecy outage probability of a typical UAV-and-legitimate-
receiver pair is given by
Pzoneso = 1− EΦu
{
exp
[
−λe
{∫
B(o,K)\B(o,D)
∑
u∈Φu\ΦLe∏
m∈Φu\ΦLe,m 6=u
D
α
N
me
D
α
N
me −DαNue(
1− exp
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− ηLD
α
N
ue
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N
βeD
α
L
0e
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η
L
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ue
η
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∑
l∈ΦLe
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L
le
])}
de
+
∫
R2\B(o,K)
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l∈ΦLe
{
exp
[
−ηLβeD
α
N
0e
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N
D
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L
le
]}
×
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u∈Φu\ΦLe
{
1
1 + βeD
α
N
0e D
−α
N
ue
}
de
}]}
. (28)
Proof: See Appendix F.
Notice that the exact expression of the secrecy outage prob-
ability in Theorem 4 is too complicated. Therefore, similarly
as in Section III, we approximate the LoS wireless channel
power gain as a Rayleigh fading one with the same path loss
and denote the correspondingly achieved SIRs as those in (12)
and (13). Then we have the following theorem.
Corollary 3: Under the secrecy guard zone with radius D,
the approximate secrecy outage probability of a typical UAV-
and-legitimate-receiver pair is given by
P˜zoneso =


1− exp
[
− πλe
Q1
exp
[
−Q1
× (H2 +D2)+ πλuH2]
]
, if D ≥ K,
1− exp
[
−2πλe exp
[
πλuH
2
]
×
{
η
1
2
L
2η
1
2
N
Q1
exp
[
− η
1
2
N
η
1
2
L
Q1
(
H2 +K2
)]
+
(1+Q1
√
H2+D2) exp[−Q1
√
H2+D2]
Q2
1
− (1+Q1
√
H2+K2) exp[−Q1
√
H2+K2]
Q2
1
}]
,if D < K.
(29)
Proof: See Appendix G.
Corollary 3 provides the secrecy outage probability in a
closed form, which provide design insights. For example, it is
shown that P˜zoneso is monotonically decreasing with respect to
the secrecy guard zone radius D. This is expected, as a larger
D reduces the chance for eavesdropping.
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Fig. 5. The secrecy outage probability with secrecy guard zone versus the
eavesdroppers’ density λe, where we set λu = 10−3 , H = 10 m, and
θc = pi/4.
Fig. 5 shows the approximate secrecy outage probability
P˜zoneso in (29), as compared to the Monte Carlo simulations. It is
observed that our proposed approximation matches well with
the Monte Carlo simulation results under practical scenarios
when the secrecy outage probability is small (e.g., 0 ∼ 0.1).
B. Secrecy Transmission Capacity Maximization
In this subsection, based on the approximations, we jointly
design the wiretap code rates Rt and Rs, the UAV positioning
altitude H , and the guard zone radius D to maximize the
secrecy transmission capacity while satisfying a maximum se-
crecy outage probability constraint. With the approximations in
(16) and (29), the secrecy maximization problem is expressed
as
(P2.1) : max
Rt,Rs,H,D
C˜s = RsP˜cλu′, (30a)
s.t. P˜zoneso ≤ ǫ, (30b)
Rt ≥ Rs, (30c)
Rs ≥ 0, (30d)
D ≥ 0, (30e)
Hmax ≥ H ≥ Hmin. (30f)
It can be observed in (30a) that a larger guard zone radius
D leads to lower secrecy outage probability P˜zoneso , but also
reduces the density of actual UAV transmitters. As a result,
there generally exists a tradeoff in designing the guard zone
radius D.
Notice that problem (P2.1) is even more difficult to be
optimally solved than (P1.1). In the following, we first obtain
the closed-form solution of Rt and Rs under any given UAV
positioning altitude H and guard zone radius D, and then use
a two-dimensional (2D) search over H ∈ [Hmin, Hmax] and
D ≥ 0 to maximize the secrecy transmission capacity. In the
following, we focus on finding the optimal Rt and Rs under
any given H and D, for which the problem is expressed as
(P2.2) : max
Rt,Rs
C˜s = RsP˜cλu′, (31a)
s.t. P˜zoneso ≤ ǫ, (31b)
Rt ≥ Rs, (31c)
Rs ≥ 0. (31d)
In order to solve problem (P2.2), similarly as for (P1.2), we
introduce the auxiliary variable Re = Rt−Rs. By substituting
Rs = Rt −Re, problem (P2.2) is equivalent to
(P2.3) : max
Rt,Re
C˜s = (Rt −Re)P˜cλu′, (32a)
s.t. P˜zoneso ≤ ǫ, (32b)
Rt ≥ Re, (32c)
Re ≥ 0. (32d)
Notice that both P˜zoneso and C˜s are monotonically decreasing
functions with respect to Re ≥ 0. Hence, at the optimality
of problem (P2.3), constraint (32b) must be met with strict
equality, i.e.,
P˜zoneso = ǫ. (33)
By solving the equality in (33) via a 1D search, we can obtain
the optimal Re, denoted by R
⋆
e . Notice that in the special case
with D ≥ L, the optimal R⋆e can be obtained in closed-form
as
R⋆e = log2
[
4
π4λu
2 (H2 +D2)
2
×W0
(
πλe
(
H2 +D2
)
exp
[
πλuH
2
]
ln 11−ǫ
)2
+ 1
]
. (34)
Next, it remains to find Rt to problem (P2.3). Similar to
(P1.3), solving for Rt in problem (P2.3) can be approximated
as
(P2.4) : max
Rt
Cs = (Rt −R⋆e)P¯cλu′, (35a)
s.t. Rt ≥ R∗e . (35b)
We then have the following theorem.
Theorem 5: The objective function Cs in (35a) is a concave
function with respect to Rt ≥ 0. The optimal solution of Rt
to problem (P2.4) is given as
R⋆t = R
⋆
e +
2
ln 2
W0
(
η
1
2
L 2
−R⋆e+1
η
1
2
Nπ2λuH
)
. (36)
Proof: See Appendix H.
By combining R⋆t and R
⋆
e , the corresponding Rs is obtained
as
R⋆s =
2
ln 2
W0
(
η
1
2
L 2
−R⋆e+1
η
1
2
Nπ2λuH
)
. (37)
To gain more insights, we further present the following
corollary.
Corollary 4: It follows that as the guard zone radius D in-
creases, the optimal rate parameter R⋆t first decreases and then
increases, while R⋆s increases monotonically. Furthermore, as
D →∞, we have
R⋆t = R
⋆
s =
2
ln 2
W0
(
2η
1
2
L
η
1
2
Nπ2λuH
)
. (38)
In this case, the corresponding secrecy transmission capacity
becomes zero.
Proof: See Appendix I.
Corollary 4 shows that as D becomes significantly large, the
secrecy transmission capacity becomes zero. This is intuitive,
as the set of actual UAV transmitters becomes a null set in this
case. As a result, it is expected that the optimal guard zone
radius D should be a finite value.
Finally, by combining R⋆t and R
⋆
s , together with the 2D
search over H and D, the desirable system configurations are
obtained for the case with secrecy guard zone. During the 2D
search, we choose a sufficient large value of D as the upper
bound for search.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to validate
the theoretical analysis above. Unless otherwise stated, in the
following we set the security constraint ǫ = 0.01, the UAVs’
(or equivalently the legitimate receivers’) density λu = 10
−3,
the eavesdroppers’ density λe = 10
−3, and the elevation angle
threshold θc = π/4.
A. Secrecy Communication Performance under Given UAV
Altitude H and Guard Zone Radius D
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Fig. 6. Secrecy communication performance without secrecy guard zone
versus the eavesdroppers’ density λe.
First, we consider the case with given UAV altitude H and
guard zone radius D. Fig. 6 shows the secrecy communication
performance without secrecy guard zone versus the eavesdrop-
pers’ density λe, where different values of UAV altitude H are
considered. It is observed that as λe increases, both Rt and
Re increase. This is because that in order to defend against
more eavesdroppers, UAVs need to increase the randomness
in the wiretap code (with increased Re) to maintain the same
level of secrecy. As a consequence, Rt is increased as well.
Furthermore, as the attitude H decreases, the values of Rt
and Re are observed to increase significantly. This is because
that the eavesdropping channel quality becomes better when
the attitude H decreases, and thus Re should increase to add
more randomness in the wiretap code to maintain the same
level of secrecy. It is also observed that as the UAV altitude
H decreases, the secrecy transmission capacity Cs increases.
This is intuitive, which is due to the fact that as H decreases,
the increase of the LoS legitimate channel power gains is more
significantly than that of the eavesdropping channels.
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Fig. 7. Secrecy communication performance with secrecy guard zone versus
the eavesdroppers’ density λe, where H = 20 m.
Fig. 7 shows the secrecy communication performance with
secrecy guard zone versus the eavesdroppers’ density λe,
where we set H = 20 m. Similar trends are observed as in
Fig. 6. Besides, it is also observed that the guard zone radius
D = 20 m leads to a larger secrecy transmission capacity Cs
than D = 10 m and D = 50 m. This is consistent with our
result in Corollary 4 that the optimal value of D should be
finite.
Fig. 8 shows the secrecy transmission capacity Cs versus
UAV positioning altitude H , under different values of guard
zone radius D. It is observed that as the UAV altitude H
increases, the secrecy transmission capacity Cs decreases. This
can be explained similarly as in Fig. 6. When D = 20 m
and H ≤ 20 m, the achieved secrecy transmission capacity is
observed to significantly outperform that without guard zone
employed (i.e., D = 0 m). This verifies the importance of
the secrecy guard zone technique in secrecy communication
performance enhancement. It is also observed that for all val-
ues of D, the secrecy transmission capacity decreases sharply
as H becomes larger than D. This is expected, as in this
case there exist eavesdroppers in the LoS regions (with LoS
threshold K = H under θc = π/4), thus leading to stronger
eavesdropping channels with reduced secrecy communication
performance.
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Fig. 8. The secrecy transmission capacity Cs versus UAV positioning altitude
H .
B. Optimized Secrecy Transmission Design
Next, we show the secrecy communication performance
under optimized system configurations in terms of Rt, Rs,
H , and D.
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Fig. 9. The optimized secrecy transmission capacity Cs versus the eaves-
droppers’ density λe.
Figs. 9 and 10 show the optimized secrecy transmission ca-
pacity Cs versus the eavesdroppers’ density λe and the UAVs’
density λu, respectively. It is observed that Cs decreases
monotonically as λe increases, while increases monotonically
as λu increases. It is also observed that, under all values of λe,
the use of secrecy guard zone leads to much higher secrecy
transmission capacity than that without secrecy guard zone.
Fig. 11 shows the optimized secrecy guard zone radius
D versus the eavesdroppers’ density λe. It is observed that
the obtained D decreases in general as λe increases. This
shows that as the eavesdroppers’ density increases, we should
properly reduce D to enable more UAVs to involve in the
secrecy transmission, as the correspondingly achieved benefit
outweighs the drawback caused by the increased chance of
eavesdropping. It is also observed that the optimized guard
zone radius D decreases as λu increases. This is expected, as
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Fig. 10. The optimized secrecy transmission capacity Cs versus the UAVs’
density λu.
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Fig. 11. The optimized secrecy guard zone radiusD versus the eavesdroppers’
density λe.
the increase of UAVs’ density leads to stronger interference at
the eavesdroppers, thus leading to more significantly reduced
SIR at eavesdroppers than legitimate receivers. In this case, a
smaller guard zone radius D is desirable.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we investigated the secrecy transmission of
a large-scale UAV-enabled wireless network. We model the
horizontal locations of legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers
as two independent PPPs and assume that the UAVs are each
positioned exactly above the respective legitimate receivers
for efficient secrecy communication. Under this setup and by
considering two cases without and with the secrecy guard
zone technique employed, we obtained analytical expressions
for the connection probability and secrecy outage probability
of this network in analytically tractable forms. Accordingly,
we optimized the system configurations (in terms of the
Wyner’s coding rates, UAV altitude, and guard zone size)
to maximize the secrecy transmission capacity, subject to a
maximum secrecy outage probability constraint. Finally, we
presented numerical results to validate the theoretical analysis,
and show the effect of different system parameters on the
secrecy communication performance. Our results provided
useful guidelines in analyzing the secrecy communication per-
formance of large-scale UAV-enabled 3D wireless networks,
and also provided insights on the design of secrecy transmis-
sion strategy and network configurations. Due to the space
limitation, there are still interesting problems unaddressed in
this paper, which are briefly discussed in the following to
motivate future work.
• This paper considered quasi-stationary UAV scenarios
while in other mobile UAV scenario (i.e., the UAVs
fly around during communication), how to analyze the
network performance is a challenging task. One opinion
to deal with this issue is to model the UAVs and the
eavesdroppers as two independent random processes at
each time instant. Then we can analyze the network
performance at each time by using similarly techniques
as in this paper, and then obtain the average performance
by taking an expectation over time.
• Furthermore, in mobile UAV scenarios, the UAVs may
adjust their trajectories to optimize the secrecy com-
munication performance. While prior work (see, e.g.,
[31, 32]) considered the UAV trajectory optimization in
the case with limited number of UAVs, how to combine
such design with our large-scale network analysis for
enhancing the performance a large-scale network is a
challenging problem worth further investigation.
• This paper considered the elevation-angle-dependent
LoS/NLoS channels for A2G links based on the mea-
surement results in [36], while there have been other A2G
channel models in the literature such as the probabilis-
tic LoS channels in [10] and elevation-angle-dependent
Rician fading channels in [41]. How to analysis the
large-scale network performance under different channel
models is left for future work.
• This paper considered that each UAV exactly hovers
above one single ground user for efficient communication.
For the scenario with UAVs acting as BSs to serve
multiple users, each UAV may hover near these users
but not exactly above them. In this case, the model in
[17] may be applicable. How to extend our analysis in
this case is interesting.
• Additionally, there have been various practical issues
and setups, such as different UAV attitude, directional
antennas and full-duplex radio, which have not been
considered in this work. How to extend our secrecy
communication results in these scenarios is an interesting
future direction.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
According to (7), the connection probability can be com-
puted as
Pc = P
(
η
L
H−2∑
u∈Φu
η
u0
Su0D
−αu0
u0
> βt
)
(39)
=P
(
η
L
H−2∑
l∈ΦL0
η
L
D
−α
L
l0 +
∑
u∈Φu\ΦL0
η
N
SND
−α
N
u0
> βt
)
.
Lemma 1: According to [54], for a set of independent expo-
nential random variables X = {X1, . . . , Xn} with parameters
λXi , i = 1, . . . , n, the cumulative distribution function (CDF)
of the sum of independent exponentially distributed random
variables Y =
n∑
i=1
Xi is given by
P {Y < y} =
n∑
i=1
δi (1− exp [−λXiy]), (40)
where
δi =
n∏
j=1,j 6=i
λXj
λXj − λXi
. (41)
Applying Lemma 1, (39) can be re-expressed as (10). This
theorem thus follows.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
According to (8), the secrecy outage probability can be
computed as
Pso =P
(
max
e∈Φe
{SIRe} > βe
)
(42)
=1− EΦu
{
EΦe
{∏
e∈Φe
P (SIRe < βe)
}}
.
According to [48], the probability generating functional
(PGFL) of a homogeneous PPP is given as
EΦe
{∏
e∈Φe
f (e)
}
= exp
[
−λe
∫
R2
1− f (e) de
]
. (43)
Using PGFL of Φe, (42) can be computed as
Pso = 1− EΦu
{
exp
[
−λe
∫
R2
P (SIRe > βe) de
]}
= 1− EΦu
{
exp
[
−λe (44)
×
{∫
B(o,K)
P

 ηLD−αL0e∑
u∈Φu
η
ue
SueD
−αue
ue
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 de
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Q3
}]}
.
Applying Lemma 1 over the typical eavesdropper e ∈ Φe
lying inside B (o,K), Q2 in (44) is computed as
Q2 =
∫
B(o,K)
∑
u∈Φu\ΦLe
∏
m∈Φu\ΦLe,m 6=u
D
α
N
me
D
α
N
me −DαNue
(45)
×
(
1− exp
[
− ηLD
α
N
ue
η
N
βeD
α
L
0e
+
η
L
D
α
N
ue
η
N
∑
l∈ΦLe
D
−α
L
le
])
.
Also, by calculating two expectations over exponentially
random variables SN and Sue when the typical eavesdropper
e ∈ Φe lies outside B (o,K), Q3 in (44) is computed as
Q3 =
∫
R2\B(o,K)
ESue
{
exp
[
−βeD
α
N
ue
η
N
∑
u∈Φu
η
ue
SueD
−αue
ue
]}
=
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∏
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]}
×
∏
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1
1 + βeD
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N
0e D
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N
ue
}
de
}]}
. (46)
By replacing Q2 and Q3 with (45) and (46), Pso in (44) is
re-expressed as (11). This theorem is thus verified.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
According to (14), the approximate connection probability
can be computed as
P˜c = P

 ηLS00H−2∑
u∈Φu
η
u0
Su0D
−αu0
u0
> βt

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= EΦu,Su0
{
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[
−βtH
2
η
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]}
= EΦu
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1
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2η
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D−αu0u0
}}
. (47)
Using PGFL of Φu, (47) can be rewritten as
P˜c = exp
[
−λu
∫
R2
1− 1
1 + βtη−1L H
2η
u0
D−αu0u0
du
]
. (48)
Changing to polar coordinates, (48) can be turned to
P˜c = exp
[
−2πλu (49)
{∫ +∞
K

1− 1
1 + βtη−1L H
2η
N
(ru2 +H2)
−αN
2

ru dru
+
∫ K
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1− 1
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−αL
2
)
ru dru
}]
.
Then, (49) can be re-expressed as (16). This corollary thus
follows.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF COROLLARY 2
According to (15), the approximate secrecy outage proba-
bility can be computed as
P¯so =P

max
e∈Φe

 η0eS0eD
−α0e
0e∑
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.
According to (43), (50) can be rewritten as
P¯so =1− EΦu
{
exp
[
−λe (51)
×
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R2
∏
u∈Φu
{
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[
−ηueβeSueD
−αue
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]}
.
Using Jensen’s inequality, an upper bound of P¯so can be
obtained:
P¯so ≈1− exp
[
−λe (52)
×
∫
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.
Similar to (47), (52) can be computed as
P¯so ≈ 1− exp
[
−λe
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.
In the case with D0e ≥ K , we have η
1
2
0e(H
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η
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0e β
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e
≪
1 by combing the facts that βe ≫ 1, η0e = ηN , and
α0e = 4. In the other case with D0e < K , the value
of
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e
is generally no larger than 1, as βe ≫ 1,
η
0e
= η
L
≤ η
N
, and α0e = 2. It should be noted that
the probability that the typical eavesdropper e lying inside
the LoS region is much smaller than that lying inside the
NLoS region. Hence, it generally follows that
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η
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1. Similarly, we have K
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approximation
η
1
2
N
D
α0e
2
0e β
1
2
e
η
1
2
0e (H
2+K2)
arctan
(
η
1
2
0e(H
2+K2)
η
1
2
N
D
α0e
2
0e β
1
2
e
)
≈ 1 and
Dα0e0e βe log
(
D
α0e
0e βe+H
2+K2
D
α0e
0e βe+H
2
)
≈ K2, we approximate (53) as
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Changing to polar coordinates, (54) can be turned to
P˜so =1− exp
[
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}]
. (55)
Then, (55) can be simplified as (17). This corollary is thus
verified.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The first derivative of Cs with respect to Rt is computed
as
dCs
dRt
=
[
1− ln 2
4
π2λuH 2
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2
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Next, the second derivative of Cs with respect to Rt is
computed as
d2Cs
dRt
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It is easy to obtain that d
2
Cs
dRt2
< 0. Therefore, it follows that Cs
is concave in Rt ≥ 0. In this case, by setting the first derivative
being zero, we have R∗t = R
∗
e +
2
ln 2W0
(
η
1
2
L
2−R
∗
e+1
η
1
2
N
π2λuH
)
.
Therefore, R∗t is optimal for maximizing Cs. This theorem
is thus proved.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
According to (27), using PGFL of Φe, the secrecy outage
probability is computed as
Pzoneso = 1− EΦu
{
exp
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]}
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.
Applying Lemma 1, (58) can be re-expressed as (28). This
theorem is thus verified.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF COROLLARY 3
Using PGFL of Φe, the secrecy outage probability is com-
puted as
P¯zoneso = 1− EΦu
{
exp
[
−λe (59)
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.
Using Jensen’s inequality, an upper bound of P˜so is obtained
as
P¯zoneso ≈ 1− exp
[
−λe (60)
×
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.
Similar to (39), (60) is thus computed as
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.
Since βe ≫ 1 and H2+K2
D
α0e
2
0e
≪ 1, we can derive a closed-
form upper bound of (61) as
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Changing to polar coordinates, when D ≥ K , (62) can be
turned to
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Similarly, when D < K , we have
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. (64)
Then, (63) can be simplified as (29). This corollary is thus
verified.
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
According to Theorem 3, we can show that secrecy trans-
mission capacity Cs is a concave function with respect to the
rate Rt. Accordingly, R
⋆
e satisfies the equality (33). Then, the
optimal values of R⋆t and R
⋆
s to maximize Cs are given as
R⋆t = R
⋆
e +
2
ln 2
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η
1
2
L 2
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)
, (65)
and
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η
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)
. (66)
This completes the proof.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF COROLLARY 4
First, we show that R⋆s is an increasing function with respect
to D. From the explicit expression of P˜zoneso (29), it is observed
that P˜zoneso is a decreasing function with respect to D and Re,
respectively. Notice that at the optimality, we have P˜zoneso = ǫ.
Therefore, it is evident that R⋆e is also a decreasing function
with respect to D. Furthermore, from the explicit expression
of R⋆s in (37), we can observe that R
⋆
s is a decreasing function
with respect to R⋆e . Then we can conclude that R
∗
s is an
increasing function with respect to D.
Next, we show that R⋆t first decreases and then increases as
D increases. The first derivative of R⋆t with respect to R
⋆
e is
computed as
dR⋆t
dR⋆e
=
1−W0
(
η
1
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) . (67)
It is observed that as R⋆e ≥ 0 increases, dR
⋆
t
dR⋆e
increases and the
corresponding value of
dR⋆t
dR⋆e
is first less than 0 and then larger
than 0. As R⋆t ≥ 0, R∗t first decreases and then increases as
R⋆e increases. Hence, we can conclude that R
⋆
t first decreases
and then increases as D increases.
As D → +∞, it is easy to observe that R∗e → 0. In this
case, by replacing R∗e with 0 into (36) and (37), we can obtain
R∗t = R
∗
s =
2
ln 2
W0
(
2η
1
2
L
η
1
2
Nπ2λuH
)
. (68)
As D → +∞, we have λu′ → 0. Hence, it follows that
Cs → 0 as D → +∞ from (31a).
This completes the proof.
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